

(1)
DIALOGUE

BETWIXT

Two Friends,

VALENTIUS of FRIELAND

AND

ERNEST FRIEDMAN,

Being met together in

HOLLAND,

Concerning these

Present Conjunctures.

Printed Anno Domini 1675.

DIAGRAM

1. The first part of the diagram is a rectangle with a diagonal line from the top-left corner to the bottom-right corner. This rectangle is divided into two triangles by the diagonal line.

2. The second part of the diagram is a rectangle with a diagonal line from the top-left corner to the bottom-right corner. This rectangle is divided into two triangles by the diagonal line.

3. The third part of the diagram is a rectangle with a diagonal line from the top-left corner to the bottom-right corner. This rectangle is divided into two triangles by the diagonal line.

4. The fourth part of the diagram is a rectangle with a diagonal line from the top-left corner to the bottom-right corner. This rectangle is divided into two triangles by the diagonal line.

5. The fifth part of the diagram is a rectangle with a diagonal line from the top-left corner to the bottom-right corner. This rectangle is divided into two triangles by the diagonal line.

6. The sixth part of the diagram is a rectangle with a diagonal line from the top-left corner to the bottom-right corner. This rectangle is divided into two triangles by the diagonal line.

7. The seventh part of the diagram is a rectangle with a diagonal line from the top-left corner to the bottom-right corner. This rectangle is divided into two triangles by the diagonal line.

8. The eighth part of the diagram is a rectangle with a diagonal line from the top-left corner to the bottom-right corner. This rectangle is divided into two triangles by the diagonal line.



*A Dialogue betwixt Two Friends,
Valentius of Frieland, and
Ernest Friedman, &c.*

Van Frieland.

MY Old Friend, who would have thought to have found thee in these Parts? I am the gladdest man in the world to see thee.

Friedman.

Not gladder then my self sure, to find my dear Friend here, and in health, upon the first moment of my arrival in the Hague.

Frieland.

Well: But how hast thou done this many a day? What strange alterations have there been in Christendom, since you and I saw one another last? No talk but of War, and Military Actions.

Friedman.

Since you and I parted, I have spent most of my time in Swedeland, and I do now design through France for Italy, till the troubles in Germany be over, which I hope will not be long first; for they say, that this State has been hard put to it, and may have a Peace now for it self, if it will, which in consequence will conduce likewise to the quiet of the Empire.

Frieland.

The truth of it is, God hath miraculously preserved us; and there is nothing, that we so much long for, as a general Peace:

But such is our misfortune, that we are no sooner out of one danger, but we are falling into another ; insomuch that those we took for our Friends, prove our Enemies, and threaten acts of Hostility against us.

Friedman.

I pray explain your self in this, for I do not well understand it.

Frieland.

Know then, that our Intelligence from Sweden tells us, as if that Crown likewise intended to come and Attack us, which puts us to much trouble and expence ; for in case of the worst, we must provide to defend our selves.

Friedman:

Now I took *Swedeland* to be so far from this, that I ever found them exceedingly well affected toward *Holland* ; and methinks it is an unreasonable thing, to imagine otherwise, considering the care and trouble the Crown of *Sweden* has for a long time taken, and the charge it has been at, for the procurement of an happy Peace to this State : appearing for *Holland* with so much zeal by its Embassadors, that the other Parties concern'd have not stuck to impute a Partiality to the *Swedish* Mediation : Notwithstanding the wrongs and damages which the *Swedish* Commerce and Navigation did all the while sustain, by having their Ships brought up against right and reason, and confiscated, with their Lading ; all which hath been done to my certain knowledge. Neither can I conceive it possible, for the Crown of *Sweden* in this juncture, to design any ill to this State, which could with so much ease have contributed to its overthrow, when it was in a weaker condition, and yet never acted any thing against it, although under some degree of provocation by several inconveniences it hath suffered from it. So that upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground for this apprehension.

Frieland.

Doth not the Crown of Sweden invade the Country of the Duke of Brandenburg ? and if the Elector be attacked as a Friend

Friend and Ally to this State, and for assisting Holland against the power of France, and helping to redress those wrongs, which France hath done to the Roman Empire, contrary to the Westphalian Treaty, or the Instrument of Peace: Is not this as much as to take up Armes against this State? especially since it gives France time to recover breath, and attack us and our Allies with a greater Force.

Friedman.

'Tis true, that I have observ'd *Swedeland* to be much unsatisfied about the proceedings of the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, and I have heard many complaints, as if he comported himself in such a manner, as that thereupon a rupture betwixt the Crown of *Sweden* and that Elector was likely to ensue. I have also heard, that the High Constable of *Sweden* Count *Wrangle* was marched into the Territories of *Brandenburgh*, but I could never learn other, then that the said Elector had even forced the Crown of *Sweden* to this resolution: And it seems to me that this Controversie betwixt *Sweden* and *Brandenburgh*, is wholly Forreign as to the point in question, concerning this State. The Allies of this State are so many, that they make up at present the greatest part of *Europe*; now put the case, that these several Allies having divers Interests, should break one with another; this State, by your way of reasoning, must concern it self in all their Quarrels: a thing not only difficult to conceive, but also impracticable. The only way to compose these mischiefs, and to prevent other, for the time to come, must be a General Peace.

Frieland.

You say well; But how to gain that Peace, is the question: for this way of proceeding tends rather to multiply disputes, then reconcile them.

Friedman.

This might be justly said, if the Crown of *Sweden* by the resolution taken against *Brandenburgh*, should any way endeavour to hinder this State, from making of a Peace; or improve this War to an advantage, of making any Conquest
in

in *Brandenburgh's* Country, or in the *Roman* Empire. But seeing that the Crown of *Sweden* takes up Arms singly and wholly to support and maintain the *Westphalian* Peace, and to frustrate those Counsels and Designs, which would at length inevitably overthrow the same; labouring also in the mean time to procure a Peace to the *United Provinces*, it cannot be charged upon the Crown of *Sweden*, either to act, or to design any thing to the disquiet or prejudice of this State.

Frieland.

The preservation of the Westphalian Peace is as much our care, and business, as theirs, as appears by the provisions we have made for it in all our Alliances.

Friedman.

If it be so, then are this State and *Sweden* agreed upon that point; and there is no cause of complaint, if the Crown of *Sweden*, having tried in vain to preserve the Treaty by fair means, find it necessary to endeavour it by force, as the only way to attain the end desired: And it were to be wish'd, that all the outward pretenders to the maintenance of the said Treaty, were in their hearts as well inclined thereunto; which may be much doubted, considering those rigours, and severities, which have been exercised upon the poor Protestants in *Silesia*, and in the Imperial Hereditary Countries, contrary to the Conditions therein agreed upon. But in regard that the two Crowns of *Sweden* and *France*, stand engaged by vertue of the said Treaty, for the maintenance of the Right and the Freedom of the States in the Empire, it cannot be expected, that all the Parties concerned should take any great pleasure in that prospect; as hath been found by the experience of several Protestant Princes and Members of the Empire, who have been often deprived of those common benefits, which Law and Justice allows to every man.

And he that rightly considers, how several States of the Empire, and chiefly the Protestants, have been dealt with, during this present War in *Germany*, will find reason to suspect,

peſt; that it was purpoſely intended to ruine them, to the
 end that that power might at laſt overweigh, which was
 formerly ballanc'd by the *Westphalian* Treaty: Now on the
 other ſide, it will appear very clearly to all the World, and
 to all reaſonable men, that *Swedeland's* real intention is to
 preſerve the *Westphalian* Treaty in its full force; That is it
 which *Sweden* hath fought for above twenty years; and
 many thouſand *Swedes* lie on that ſcore buried in *Germany*,
 where the Great *Gustavus Adolphus* did alſo ſacrifice his life
 for the ſame. Neither did the Crown of *Sweden* ever intend
 any other thing, then to recover to the States of the Empire
 their ancient Liberty, Right, and Security, which for that
 time lay groaning under intollerable Tyranny; and hath
 alſo ſtroven to reſtore them to a peaceable condition again.
 And to this effect did *Sweden* deliver up many Strong Holds
 and Advantages, which it had poſſeſſed it ſelf of in *Germany*,
 reſting contented with very ſmall and reaſonable terms,
 meerly to have thereby an eaſie correſpondence with the
 Empire, chiefly for the ſecurity of the Interſt of the Prote-
 ſtant Princes: So that none of the ſaid Proteſtants, nor any
 Member of the Empire in general, but muſt acknowledge,
 to owe unto the Crown of *Sweden* in that affair a great ob-
 ligation. Yea *Sweden* it ſelf, which in regard of *Pomerania*
 and *Bremen* is become a State or Member of the Empire, and
 cannot be maintained therein, but by the *Westphalian* Trea-
 ty, muſt be ſuppoſed ſo wiſe, as not to act any thing againſt
 its own Interſt. And therefore in reaſon the *Westphalian*
 Treaty ought to be as dear to the King of *Sweden*, as the
 Union of the Seven Provinces is to the *States General*: and
 his Maſteſty cannot at all be blamed for being very carefull
 of the conſervation of the ſame; nor can ſuch his inclina-
 tion be condemned here in *Holland*, ſince the *States General*
 receive alſo thereby a great benefit, and a joynt protection.
 So that conſidering the premiſſes, I cannot find what reaſon-
 able ground *Holland* can have to go counter to *Sweden*, as
 you were pleaſed juſt now to ſay they were reſolved to do;
 principally ſince I am aſſured, that nothing will be more ac-
 ceptable

ceptable to the Crown of *Sweden*, then to continue in a good understanding with this State, and to have just cause to bear a real and amicable affection towards the same; which is made evident enough to the World, by the King of *Sweden's* constant care and tenderness for the welfare of the United Provinces, making no difficulty to continue it, and the negotiation of the Treaty, in favour of the Interest of this State, notwithstanding the Assembly of *Cologne* was interrupted, and *Sweden* in reason might have been weary of its Mediation; which yet hath sent Embassadors both by Sea and Land to several Courts of *Europe*, to dispose them unto a Peace: whereby the Crown of *Sweden* may with good reason pretend to have merited particularly from this State. And besides, whereas these two States, *Sweden* and the *United Provinces*, may produce many great advantages and profits, both to their mutual conservation, and the increase of Commerce and Trade, so the King of *Sweden* hath purposefully endeavoured to enter into the same confidence with this State, as it hath been used between them in former times, renewing for that end, by his Embassadors that were here, the ancient Alliances, and adjusting all those matters which might have given any the least occasion of difference. And further, to strengthen the said mutual Bond and Alliance, his said Majesty hath as well before, in case any such thing should have been propounded by this State, lodged such requisite Orders with his said Embassadors, as now sent to his Embassador, that is for the present here, full power thereunto, as I am credibly informed, and is probably not unknown unto your self. Now for the *States General*, to pay their acknowledgments with any contrary design, and in an hostile manner, chiefly in a business, wherein they are nothing at all concerned, and wherein the Crown of *Sweden* is obliged to act for the defence of its own Interest, I leave it to your own consideration, and to judge if in Justice it can be maintained.

Frieland.

I must confess, that we have great reason to give the Crown of

of Sweden thanks for all the favour, kindness and care which the King hath shewed towards this State, and I do very well see, that both these States may produce great advantages, to their respective Interest and concerns. But I cannot also forbear to tell you, that they cannot find here, upon what ground the differences between Sweden and Brandenburg must be grounded, just at a time, when nothing is so highly desired and wished by us, as a good and happy Peace, and when we flattered our selves, with some appearance of it. Therefore I intreat you, as coming now out of Sweden, and where doubtless you have endeavoured to get a particular and true information of those affairs, to let me know, what may be the Elector's faults, that he should be thus Attack'd. And although there should be some difference between them, why have they not endeavoured to use rather at first some friendly wayes, for a composure, (and wherein this State should certainly have imployed all its endeavours) then to suffer it to come to the extremities of a War?

Friedman.

I am ready to give you all satisfaction, as far as I am informed thereof. But to attain to the true ground of the same, it will be necessary for you to know, how far the whole Empire stands ingaged, by vertue of the *Westphalian* Treaty, and the Instrument of Peace, relating as well expressly to *France*, as also to *Sweden*, in regard of the Common Interest which both these Crowns have in the said Treaty, and in the mutual advantages, which were then granted unto them; viz. That none of the States of the Empire shall or may give any Succour or Assistance to any Enemies of either of the Crowns, living out of the Empire. This so dear bought Security for *Sweden* and *France*, hath the King of *Sweden* with great earnestness always endeavoured to maintain in its full force; As to his cost he did in the late *Polonian* and *Danish* War, where some setting wholly aside the Obligation of the Instrument of Peace of *Westphalia*, proceeded with such hostility against *Sweden*, as if *Sweden* could not have pretended to any Interest in the said Treaty; for so did the Emperour, and the present Elector of *Brandenburg*,

burgh, at that time demean themselves toward the late King *Charles Gustaff* of blessed memory : a story so fresh, that it needs not to be repeated. And this is the true reason, why his Majesty of *Sweden*, seeing a War to threaten the neighbourhood of the Empire, and in probability to go further, as it since hath done, did prudentially enter into a new Alliance with *France*, for the maintaining of the abovesaid Security, which was given to both the Crowns by the said Instrument of Peace, and which formerly had been violated against *Sweden*, when the differences which were at that time between *Sweden* and *Poland*, and afterwards with *Denmark*, did no more concern the Empire, then this present Quarrel between *France* and *Holland* seems to concern the same. And this is the Alliance which the Crown of *Sweden* did conclude with *France*, in the year 1672. last past, grounded upon that foundation, which was laid by the *Westphalian* Treaty, and which the *States General* can no more now interpret to have been designed to their prejudice, then they heretofore could interpret the King of *France's* proceedings (in the late *Pollish* and *Danish* Wars, upon the same ground declared) a breaking with the Emperour, in case he did not lay down his Armes, which the Emperour then used against *Sweden*; So that whatsoever is agreed on between the Crowns of *Sweden* and of *France*, doth only concern the real observance and maintenance of that Security, which was granted to them both by the said *Westphalian* Treaty, and therefore it cannot be said, that any thing hath been concluded to the prejudice of the *States General*, which hath been agreed upon between the Kings of *Sweden* and of *France*, only to provide, that the present War which *Holland* stands involved in, might not indanger their own Security : Chiefly the King of *Sweden* having shewed himself very backward, to enter into any Alliance or Association with *England* and *France*, when he was by them informed of their design, to go joyntly against *Holland*, although he could not but see great advantages lye before him, and *Holland* by its own Conduct, might very well have deserved it from *Sweden*, by
their

their strange comportment in several occasions ; wherein the *States General* did shew themselves very little concerned for *Swedeland's* Interest, and continued yet in the same unkindness at the time of sending their Embassadors to *Sweden*, when this present War between *Holland* and *France*, was already coming on ; for in lieu of bringing any Orders with him for adjusting and composing of several differences, that remained between *Sweden* and *Holland*, the said Embassador declared, that he had no Orders in that business ; which makes it evident to all the world, that *Sweden* could not draw any other consequence or conclusion from such a procedure, then that the *States General* continued in the same neglect of their Interest with *Sweden*, and that the same must rather have increased then diminished with them, since the present conjuncture of the affairs in *Europe* seemed to invite them to another method of proceedings.

Frieland.

Sir, give me leave to interrupt you a little, before you proceed any further. I confess that I have heard people speak very often of this Alliance between Sweden and France, and that very differently ; nor can I find that interpretation, which both Sweden and France do make of the Westphalian Treaty, to be so well grounded as is pretended : It being manifest, that both the Crowns seem disposed to deprive the States of the Empire of the freedom to enter into any Forreign Alliance, which is a particular Right, belonging even to any Free-State whatsoever. And moreover would I fain know the reason, why the Crown of Sweden so earnestly imbraces the Alliance with France, and yet refuses that with Holland, though offered with great advantages ?

Friedman.

Far be it, that the Crowns of *Sweden* and *France* should intend to deprive the States of the Empire of the freedom of making Alliances : for it were a thing quite contrary to that care which both Crowns have had for the preservation of their Priviledges in the *Westphalian* Treaty. The Crown of *Sweden* it self hath made several Alliances with *Brandenburgh*,

and other Princes of the Empire, for their mutual defence, and maintenance of the *Westphalian* Treaty; whereby it is evident, that the States may also treat with others, and others with them: but that the States of the Empire shall have the freedom to conclude any offensive Alliances with the Enemies of both the Crowns of *Sweden* and *France*, and contrary to that Security, which the *Westphalian* Treaty allows unto both the Crowns, cannot more be approved of, then all other things that are directly against the *Westphalian* Treaty. And indeed *Sweden* ought at least to expect that return of gratitude, from the States of the Empire, considering the effusion of so much *Swedish* blood, to redress and maintain these Priviledges (as it appears by the eighth Article of the Instrument of Peace) which were trodden under foot; and also in regard of that tie and obligation, which the Crown of *Sweden* had taken upon it self, to become Guarranty for what was obtained for the freedom and advantage of the States of the Empire, by the *Westphalian* Treaty, that the States themselves should disapprove of all that, which any ways might expose or indanger the Interest and Security of *Sweden*. And to pass by many other reasons, which do clearly evidence, that the interpretations of the *Westphalian* Treaty (whereupon as a solid ground and foundation both the Crowns have made the Alliance aforesaid between themselves) are right and just, this only thing will suffice, most clearly to convince the world of the truth thereof, that the Emperour himself hath acknowledged as much in the Alliance which he did conclude with *France*, at the same time when this War began, and near the very days when *Sweden* concluded its Treaty with *France* in the year 1672.

Concerning your second objection, it is to be observed, that the nature of the Alliance between *Sweden* and *France* is such, that it was not in the King of *Sweden*'s power, upon the King of *France*'s request, to refuse it: Neither could *Sweden* more refuse the Guarranty of the *Westphalian* Treaty unto *France*, then *France* to *Sweden*, without breaking the obligation which *France* lies under for the support and maintenance.

tenance thereof. Moreover, the chief point which this Treaty with *France* aims at, is to preserve the *Westphalian* Treaty intire from any alteration, and to wrong no body thereby; but the Treaty which the *States General* did propound to *Sweden*, about the beginning of this War, was of a quite different nature: For first, the project was new, drawing its beginning from the then rising Conjunction of Affairs; when his Majesty of *Sweden* had his hands free to do, or refuse, according as the matter might succeed, or fall out, to the one or the other of his three Friends advantage or disadvantage. Secondly, The said Alliance which the *Dutch* projected, did strike directly at two of the Crown of *Sweden's* best and old Friends and Allies, and with whom the said Crown had not the least occasion of difference: And the King of *Sweden* could not but see, that it would be too hazardous, that he by pleasing one of his Allies, should fall out with two of his most ancient Friends and best Allies, chiefly there being no antecedent provocation to such a proceeding.

But to go on where I left, concerning the Elector of *Brandenburgh*; his Majesty of *Sweden* did also communicate unto the said Elector, as well as other Princes of the Empire his Allies, the said Treaty with *France*, as soon as it was concluded, and met with no contradiction from the said Elector, but rather an acknowledgment that the same was grounded upon a very beneficial design, for the Empire: So that the King of *Sweden* having so well provided for a general satisfaction, and for his own security in the Empire, was in hope that he might then undertake the Mediation, which was conferr'd upon him by the consent of all the Parties concern'd in the War, and by his Interest to procure a Cessation of Armes, and expect a fair issue of the War in which the *States General* were engaged; But while the King of *Sweden* was imploying all his industry and care upon the Negotiation of Peace, the Elector of *Brandenburgh* breaks out into a War with *France*, but with so ill success, that he finds himself forced by the Army of Mons. *de Turenne*, to try to save him-
self

self by an Accommodation with *France*; The King of *Sweden* seconds his intention, not so as to do this State any prejudice thereby, on whose behalf he had so far ingaged himself, for the procurement of a happy Peace, but to deliver a principal Member of the Empire, his Ally, from utter ruine. The said Elector comes at last to a conclusion with *France*, yet not without the condition, that the Kings of *Sweden* and *England* should be the Guarrants for performance of the Conditions then agreed upon; From which time the said Elector seemed very ready to Act *communicatis Consiliis* with *Sweden*, for the security of the Empire, and for the advancement of a happy Peace in the Neighbourhood. And whereas there was then in being a former Treaty of Alliance, concluded for nine or ten years between *Sweden* and *Brandenburg*, which about the same time was almost expired; as soon as the said Elector had concluded this advantageous Treaty with *France*, he desired the said Treaty with *Sweden* might also be renewed. The King of *Sweden* was thereby induced, to dispatch General *Mardefield* and Collonel *Wangelin*, to that end, to the said Elector, and among other things, to accommodate some new matters to the present juncture of Affairs: And then the said Elector promised, to live in the mean while in Neutrality; that to that purpose he would endeavour by his good offices at all Courts, to advance the Negotiation of Peace already in hand, and to maintain quiet and tranquility in the Empire, whilst the King of *Sweden* should on his side continue his Mediation: But if time should give an occasion to either party, to take other measures, then it should be done with a mutual notification, consideration and resolution on both sides, expressly stipulating, that it should not be lawfull for either of the parties, to enter into a new Alliance, without the others knowledge. This agreement about the forementioned Neutrality, which the King of *Sweden* and the said Elector found very beneficial, together with their unanimous correspondence, both in Counsels and Actions, did not aim, as I acquainted you before, at any other end, then the quietness of

of *Germany*, and its preservation, and the conclusion of a Peace between this State and its Enemies. And it was performed accordingly, as well during the Negotiation of the said Treaty, as since the conclusion thereof, by the said Elector, to the great advantage of the Empire; who sent his Envoy the Baron *Marenholz* from *Ratisbone* to the Emperour's Court, with an intention to dissuade the Emperour from the march of those Troops, which he intended to send into the Empire, shewing him an easier way to obtain satisfaction, and avoid the danger, which otherwise might arise from such a violent proceeding. And moreover, when the *French* Minister *Monf. Verjus*, endeavoured to draw the said Elector into the *French* party; his Electoral Highness answered and declared, that he would not take further notice of any party, but remain unalterable with that Neutrality in which he stood engaged, and promote the Peace, reiterating several times since the said resolution to the King of *Sweden*'s Minister, residing at his Court. The King of *Sweden* hath likewise on his side not been wanting, to shew his readiness to live according to the tenour of the Treaty, informing the Elector of all things and passages, as they fell out, and communicating unto him the several projects of Treaties, which were in hand with several Princes and States; as also those projects which were on foot in *Cologne*, between his Majesties Ministers, and several Princes in *Germany*, about the promoting of a Peace, and a mutual Safety; deferring also all things to the Counsel and Advice of the said Elector: who likewise did very often on his side shew a great jealousy over some increasing power, whereby the Interest of the Protestant Religion might fall into any danger. But at the very time when the King of *Sweden* relied upon the Treaty, and his unfeigned Conduct and Carriage towards the Elector; as also upon the many assurances, which from time to time he received from himself; then did his Majesty not without a great surprize hear, that the said Elector had changed on a sudden, concealing from him all his actions, and pretending ignorance of any Treaty that should

should be on foot between him and the *States General*, when in truth it was so, and afterwards finished without the least information or participation given of what had past. The King of *Sweden*'s Minister at *Berlin*, Collonel *Wangelin*, having an hint of it, desired with all decent remonstrance, that the Elector would not recede from that, which had been concluded and agreed on, between the King his Master and the said Elector. But he was entertained only with fair words and promises, that the Elector would firmly adhere to his Neutrality, and to his agreement between the King of *Sweden* and himself; yet in the mean while kept the whole Negotiation so secret, that no certainty could be had of it, before it was advis'd from *Holland*, and other places, both to the King of *Sweden*, and his Minister at *Berlin*; who immediately thereupon address'd himself to the Elector, humbly beseeching him to make a serious reflection, upon this his Carriage towards the King of *Sweden*; and rather to stand to those Treaties, which were so newly concluded with *Sweden*. The Elector then at last declared, that he was resolv'd to begin his March for the defence of the Empire; as being oblig'd by the mutual agreement, which was between all the Electors of the Empire, to espouse the Interest of the Electors of *Trier* and *Palatine* against *France*. And though the *Swedish* Minister applied all his best endeavours, to perswade the Elector to stand stedfast to his Alliance, and the many Protestations given to *Sweden*, which might yet prevent great inconveniences to ensue, and to desist at least from this his purpose, till he might give the King of *Sweden* information thereof, by an Express, and receive his Majesties answer; yet could he not obtain any of his so just desires, but only was amus'd with many fair words, without any stop put to so dangerous a resolution. And that which the more aggravates the Elector's proceeding is, that the said Elector not only concluded an Alliance with *Holland*, but also with *Spain*, at the same time, and that upon very extraordinary conditions: Amongst others, that he the said Elector receiving Supplies as well from *Spain* as *Holland*, and the

the quality of General upon him, engages himself; to attend and follow the order of the Emperour, *Spain*, and the *States General*, and to act immediately upon the place, and in such manner as they shall direct: And moreover, that all his Generals, himself not excepted, to whom the Elector in case of any sudden Sickness, should give the Command of all his Troops in his place, should joyntly with the whole Army take an Oath of Fidelity to the Confederates; a thing not to be expected from a Confederate Army, or from any associated Armes, but is an intire, separate, new ingagement and obligation. And to give you a more ample information of the Elector's variable Comportment and Conduct, I cannot forbear to make you acquainted with a very remarkable passage, whereby the Elector fram'd a project of getting Subsidies of *France*, *per indirectum*, and by the Crown of *Sweden*, under a pretension, thereby to maintain his Army as a Neuter, for the common and publick good; For the performance of which, the King of *Sweden* sends such power and orders to his Minister Monsieur *Wangelin*, as was desired by the Elector. But this was no sooner set on foot, but the Elector changes again, and engages himself in the abovesaid Alliance. Now Sir do you judge, if these proceedings be not very surprizing, and if the Crown of *Sweden* hath not great reason, to be very much dissatisfied with the Elector, who almost at the same moment, when he concludes with *Sweden*, and promises a Neutrality, (at least a Communication of Counsels, if he should be obliged to take any to the contrary) enters into another Alliance with the *States General*, quite contrary to the former; and if these actions of the Elector can be otherwise understood by the King of *Sweden*, then as a meer contrivance, to lull *Sweden* asleep, till he might put that in execution, which he knew *Sweden* could neither with prudence or safety yield unto. You know very well, how a private man is look'd upon, when being once engaged in society with others, he goes off from his words and ingagements. And to what purpose should the Elector hide from *Sweden* the conclusion of this Alliance with the

States General, were it not that he had fully been convinced, that the engagements which he had with *Sweden*, could in no way be compatible with those designs which were intended by the Alliance with *Holland*? And it is usually observed, that seldom any thing is concealed from an Ally and Friend, wherein he is concerned, unless there be a design to surprize him. And though I find, that the Ministers of the said Elector, and he himself also, do pretend, that all this transaction was communicated unto the said Collonel *Wangelin*, his Majesties Minister; yet am I fully informed to the contrary, and do assure you, that it is to be proved by very satisfactory Arguments, that the Elector hath excused himself, that he was obliged to forbear the giving of any information, of what was concluded between him and this State, to Collonel *Wangelin*, because he feared, that the *Swedish* Minister might impart it to the *French* Minister, who was about the same time at the Elector's Court at *Berlin*. Pray tell me, hath the King of *France* deserved this kind of confidence and comportment from the Elector, by his admitting not only an accommodation between them, when he was in a condition intirely to ruine him, but also by restoring unto the said Elector, those places which he had taken from the *Dutch*, and which the Elector should have left to *France* for its security? And it cannot but be admired, that the Ministers of the said Elector should pretend the reason of their restitution to be, because the King of *France* could not keep them any longer; which I leave to others to judge: yet let the Elector turn the matter which way he pleases, there can be no other conclusion drawn from it, then that such proceedings can no ways be excused, except engagements and obligations be no longer binding, then till we have a power to break them; and that former benefits must no longer be remembred, then till we may safely forget them. Nor hath the King of *Sweden*'s so sincere and upright dealing, by concluding of this Alliance with *Brandenburgh*, by communicating to the Elector his thoughts of the Peace, and its restoration, and accepting of his fair words
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for a concurrence in it, deserved such a requital, that it should be thought sufficient, to amuse the Crown of *Sweden* with a Treaty on Paper only, till occasion and time were given, to put in execution what was intended privately; although the said Treaty, and the States of the Empire, should fall thereby into the greatest inconveniency and confusion: it being evident, that the said Elector hath not by this his precipitated resolution, put the Affairs of the Empire in a better posture, but brought them from a bad, into a worse condition. And the Crown of *Sweden* hath a great deal of reason to look to it self, and to keep a watchfull eye over the Actions of the said Elector, when it calls to mind, how the said Elector treated the late King of *Sweden* *Charles Gustaff*, notwithstanding all the benefits and advantages he had from his said Majesty, by the Sovereignty over *Prussia*, (which his said Majesty first promoted, and laid the first ground stone) turn'd his Armes against the said King, and joyned them to those of the Emperour, and of divers other his Majesty of *Sweden*'s declared Enemies, entred those Provinces in the Empire which belonged to *Sweden*, and are comprehended under the Guarranty of the Empire, not acting as his Majesties Armies have done in his Territories, but with the greatest rigour and hostility which can be imagined: And not content with that, he agreed with the Emperour, that whatever he by his Armes should take and occupie in *Voor Pomeran*, he should keep and enjoy as his own: In the mean while did he at the same time publish through the World, that he took not up Armes for any other reason, but for the defence of the Treaty of *Westphalia*, as if it therein had been agreed and covenanted, that he might freely attack *Voor Pomeran*, and make there what Conquest he pleased. And as it is a notorious mistake, that the said Elector did inform Collonel *Wangelin* of the Alliance, when it was in hand with the *Dutch*, so it is of the same nature, what I hear the Ministers of the said Elector do publish, viz. That the said Elector was forced to take this resolution, not knowing how to maintain his Army otherwise.

wife. For what I formerly said, that there were already some projects made between the King of *Sweden*, and the said Elector, for the maintenance of his Army in such a posture and condition, that the same might advance the Negotiation of a General Peace, upon which the said Alliance between the King of *Sweden* and *Brandenburgh* was grounded, is very true, and you may rely upon, as a thing which is to be verified by many authentick Arguments.

Frieland.

How can you or any other keep the Elector from assisting the Emperour, and defending the Empire? The Laws and Constitutions of the Empire give him that liberty; and how can you disapprove of his actions, in taking up Armes, when they are conformable to the publick agreement of all the Electors?

Friedman.

This were something, if the King of *France* had declared War against the Emperour: But I find the matter of another nature, and that there was a War between the King of *France*, and the *States General*, before the Emperour did meddle therein; and that the Emperour entred into it afterwards, contrary to the Alliance which he made, as I told you, a little before with the King of *France*. And the difference which was between *France* and *Holland*, not concerning the Emperour, there cannot be found so great and urgent necessity, which should oblige the Emperour to enter into a War, and likewise induce the Elector to second him therein, if there be any reality in what the Emperour pretends, that he intended nothing by his Warlike actions, but the preservation of the *Westphalian* Treaty; since the same is to be had by other and better means: And the King of *France* likewise declares, that he neither intends any other thing, then the preservation of the said Treaty of *Westphalia*; and to that effect hath promised, to withdraw all his Troops out of the Empire, as soon as the Emperour will declare, that he will do the same; By which means the Emperour will not stand in need of any assistance from the Elector. But if the Emperour had had any just grounds to call for assistance,

assistance, then should he have accepted of the aforefaid offer of *France*, and if it had refused to stand to the same, then had the Emperour eminently justified himself: I leave you also to judge, how far the Empire can be involved in this Quarrel, and how there can be made such a matter thereof, as that it should concern the whole Empire, since for that, other things are required, then such Votes and Voices, which partly by force, partly by other artifices, have been extorted and drawn from the States of the Empire, which hath been the occasion, that many of them perceiving their precipitation, have repented and highly complained of it. It is also to be considered, that though many of the States of the Empire have yielded to it, yet not all the States unanimously have been consenting and agreeing thereunto, (which yet is very requisite in those matters, that are to pass for a general concern of the whole Empire) and some fearing what a face such proceedings may at last put on, (the ancient Liberty of the Empire being much entrenched, and the Emperour's Authority too highly advanced) begin to form other Counsels, such as may open the eyes of many other Princes, and secure the Empire against the great danger wherewith it is threatned, and about which this present War, and the *States General's* assistance, and Charges are employed. And indeed it is very much to be doubted, if the resolutions and actions of the Elector of *Brandenburgh* be to be praised, as tending to the defence of the Empire: at least the Landtgrave of *Hessen Darmstadt* (a Protestant Prince) cannot rejoyce too much in them, he and his Country being quite undone by the *Brandenburgh's* Forces. Nor can many other States of the Empire owe him great thanks for their defence, his Troops having by their continual Marches, Contributions and Exactions, totally exhausted them; to say nothing of the havock they made in *Alsatia*, to the utter ruine of many thousands of people. The Constitutions of the Empire which are so frequently insisted on, being so obligatory, do shew a quite other method to act by, and other ways to follow, then those which the Elector takes. But it

appears,

appears, the pretence of the Constitutions of the Empire, and of the preservation of the *Westphalian* Treaty, is to be the cloak wherewith is to be covered, what otherwise cannot be attained. The aforementioned Union of all the Electors of the Empire, is supposed to have been very well known to the Elector, before the conclusion of the Treaty and Alliance with *Sweden*, and doubtless he might have had the same tenderness for it then, as now he seems to have : whereby it is to be presumed, that the Elector not forgetting the said Union at the making of his Alliance with *Sweden*, found this latter a safer way then any other, and so entred into a Treaty with *Sweden* ; from which he cannot recede, under pretence of the said Union, without charging himself either with the blame of having forgotten the said Union, which is not to be supposed in a Prince, who in all other occasions is reputed very watchfull over his Interest, or to have made this Alliance with *Sweden* meerly to amuse his Majesty, reserving always to himself a way open to disingage himself, under pretence of the said Union. And it cannot be, but such pretences of the Electors, to be in an Alliance with the *States General*, to assist the Empire, and to second *Treves* and the *Palatine* by vertue of the Union, must give warning to the King of *Sweden*, and oblige him to stand upon his guard, and timely to look to his own Interest and Safety ; chiefly when it is known, that the said Elector, not like the other Members of the Empire, with a competent number, as is prescrib'd by the Matricule of the Empire, joyns his Forces to the other Forces of the States, but as General of *Spain* and *Holland*, stands by Oath ingaged both to the Emperour, *Spain*, and *Holland*, (according to the abovementioned Treaty) marching to and fro through *Germany*, to no little charge of all the States of the Empire, and chiefly of them that shew some inclination to Peace or Neutrality. Besides, he goes about to attack those Places and Strong-holds, which by vertue of the *Westphalian* Treaty belong to *France*, as it appears by the design he had upon *Philipsbourg*, and by the real Engagement before *Brisack*,
though

though hitherto with little or no success. *Sweden* yet retains in fresh memory, the appetite which the Elector shew'd to *Pomerania*, during the late War of *Poland*, and therefore hath reason to fear, that if it should so happen, that the Elector with his Confederates should quite enervate the strength of *France*, (which is a joynt Guarrant with *Sweden* for the *German* Peace) the Elector then with the Emperour's and *Spanish* Forces might easily get some advantage over *Sweden*, grasp into his hands that part of *Pomerania* so long thirsted for, and at last overthrow the whole Treaty of *Westphalia*; which I believe would not prove to the advantage of the *States General*.

Frieland.

No fear of that, for France is yet very strong; and this State will be Guarranty against all such dangers.

Friedman.

Yet this may very well happen, this Emperour having greater opportunity to effect it, then any of his Predecessors ever had; And the Crown of *Sweden* will doubtless be much beholding to this State for such a Guarranty, (*viz.*) in case the Elector, with the Emperour, and *Spain*, should strive to turn the *Swedes* out of their Conquests in *Germany*, and thereby, as also by weakening *France*, annihilate the *German* Peace; the same Guarranty being in such a case necessary to both the States, *Sweden* and *Holland*: But there is none that can think it strange, if the Crown of *Sweden* doth also use for its own preservation a due foresight and circumspection. There might also happen such a Conjunction, that such a Guarranty might not be so commodious for this State, and that this State might afterwards want power, to break so dangerous an intention.

Frieland.

How can the King of Sweden accuse the Elector of Brandenburg, for acting against the Treaty concluded betwixt them? Hath not the said Elector by a separate Article reserved to himself the freedom, to take what measures, or what party he should find the most expedient, though the King of Sweden did not take

take the same measures, nor the same party? And hath not the King of Sweden consented thereunto, and likewise reserved to himself the said Election? For what reason then can the King of Sweden take up Arms against the Elector, whilst it is agreed, that in such a case, as is now mentioned, (viz.) if the King and the Elector should happen, to be of any other, nay contrary parties, the Amity betwixt them should nevertheless be preserved, and that no Hostility should be undertaken against either?

Friedman.

I do grant, that there is, as you say, a separate Article concluded between the King and the Elector: And this is that, on which the Elector, as upon an essential condition, doth rely; which, as I hear, he in his Letter to the King of *Great Britain*, and elsewhere produceth, as a valid Argument to prove his own innocence, and the wrong done by the King of *Sweden*, relating to the resolution, which his Majesty hath been obliged to take against the Elector. But the matter being rightly considered and examined, it appears quite another thing, then what is alledged and pretended by the Elector; For, whereas that Agreement made between the King of *Sweden*, and the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, as well in the principal Treaty it self, as also in the separate Article aforementioned, had for its foundation and scope a happy Peace, and the procuring of the same, and that for that said end, as well his Majesty, as also the Elector, were joyntly to employ their good offices; both the Confederates making their reflection upon those Events which might ensue, if all their care and pains, bestowed upon the restoring of a desired Peace, should prove unsuccessful; if the parties in War should be found to reject all peaceable offers, and shew themselves more willing to protract the War, then to promote a Peace: In that consideration finally reserved to themselves, by a separate Article, that they might freely and separately, every one for himself, take such measures, and espouse such parties, whereby the King, or the Elector, should think and believe their own security best provided for; Always provided, that in the first place, and before any resolution taken,

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he that was about to separate, and joyn himself to any other Counsels, or measures, should be obliged to communicate the same before and in due time, with his other Ally, that they might be enabled sufficiently, and well to confer together about it, and to unite their Counsels. And if after all, such Union could not succeed, then either of the Confederates, as well the one as the other, is left at liberty to follow that which seems good to him; And the mutual Amity amongst them was nevertheless to stand firm and unchanged. This is the true tenour of that Agreement, which now the Elector for his advantage produceth: By which you may see, that if the Elector could make the said separate Article plead for him, then must it be requisite,

1. That according to the Agreement in the said Treaty, all good offices and endeavours to procure a Peace should first be employed by both the Confederates; and

2ly. The amicable ways propounded by both the Confederates, not being admitted by the Parties concerned in the War; then

3ly. Both the Confederates, by the obstinacy of the Parties concerned, being obliged to incline to other measures and counsels, as might be most suitable to the Interest of either of them in particular; that then

4ly. Neither of the two Confederates should take any positive resolution, before they had communicated to each other those measures, which they intend to take; And when

5ly. Both the Confederates should not be able, to agree amongst themselves in their opinion and resolution, concerning the taking of other measures, after all endeavours had been used, to make them conformable to their Interest; That then

6ly. It should be free and lawfull, and not before, to both the Confederates, to take such separate measures, as they should think most convenient for themselves, without any prejudice to the tenour of the said Treaty, or to the preservation of their mutual Amity and Friendship.

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And

And I cannot draw any other Conclusion, but that it is not left free to either of the Confederates, to separate in taking their measures, and chusing their Parties, before all the particulars aforeſaid are accompliſhed.

Let us now compare the Elector's conduct with all this : Hath the Elector ever ſince the concluded Treaty, joyned his *Pacis officia* with the King of *Sweden*, according to the Agreement, at the Court of *France*, or elſewhere ? Hath *France* rejected and reſuſed the King of *Sweden's* and the Elector's invitation to a Peace, that ſo the Elector might have had an occaſion given him, to be offended thereat, and have been obliged thereby to take other Counſels ? By no means. For the Elector ſtay'd not ſo long, till what he had agreed and concluded with the King of *Sweden* in the Treaty, might be effected, and put in execution ; But he concludes an Alliance quite contrary to all this, with the *States General*, and their Allies, before he had ſo much as tried any way of pacification, with the one or the other party concerned in the War : And he declared open War againſt *France*, before he had made any overtures for Peace, and before he had tried, whether the ſame would ſucceed or not. I can ſay nothing elſe to it, but that it is too haſty a Reſolution, to promote a Peace by ſuch means ; when the Elector did not ſtay, till he might have ſeen, what by amicable means might have been obtained, and if any of the Parties had quite declined Peace, which yet in the Treaty with the King of *Sweden* was agreed on : And it is again too ſlow a Reſolution, when I conſider, with what profit and emolument the ſame courſe might have been taken, for the reſtoring of Peace, at leaſt to the *Roman Empire*, if the Elector with the like zeal and promptitude had been willing to uphold, and ſecond that Declaration, which *France* ſeveral times did iſſue out, of its readineſs to withdraw its Troops out of the Empire, in caſe the Emperour would likewiſe oblige himſelf to do the ſame, and that the Elector had bent his Armes againſt thoſe, who were the occaſion the ſaid Declaration was not accepted of.

But

But I will frame to my self this objection, that perhaps the Elector might have had reason, not to tarry till the good offices for a Peace might succeed, but rather to hasten to other measures: However he might then have given notice thereof to the King of *Sweden*, to deliberate with him about it, and to consider joyntly, what might and could have been done; for so much the separate Article requires. But hath the Elector performed all this? No; But on the contrary, he hath kept all his proceedings secret and unknown to the King of *Sweden*, as I have told you. Therefore in respect of all this, (*viz.* the separate Article having not been by the Elector in the least, according to its true intent, fulfilled and observed) he can no ways pretend or alledge, that by vertue of the said Article, he had the liberty left him to take other measures, without disobliging the King of *Sweden*; since, when the foundation, whereupon this liberty for the taking other measures, was allowed and agreed to, doth fail, the liberty it self doth fall: Neither can the Elector of *Brandenburgh* pretend, not to have been able to prevail so far with the King of *Sweden*, as to joyn him to his Counsels, and that he therefore hath been obliged to take another way; which yet as a requisite circumstance is agreed on, in case the Elector will pretend, to take other measures and parties; For he hath not in the least communicated with the King of *Sweden* about it.

Frieland.

What then do you think the King of Sweden would demand of the Elector?

Friedman:

The Crown of *Sweden*, so far as I know, desires no Conquests of the Elector, whereof that King by his Letter to the *States General* gave full assurance; only the Crown of *Sweden* may justly demand, that the Elector should put the Affair into such a condition and state, as it was in, when the late Alliance was contracted betwixt *Brandenburgh* and *Sweden*; which I believe, this State it self will approve to be both just and reasonable.

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Frieland.

Frieland:

Sir, you will pardon me, if I declare, that I find my self not a little troubled and dissatisfied with that Argument: For you take us here to be so blind, as not to see what all this signifies; By these means shall the Elector be drawn off from this Party, and leave France not only to fall upon us, but also to overthrow the Westphalian Peace, by going with an Army into the Territories of Cleves, Liege, and many German Provinces; invading of this State, and traversing the Countrey with his Army, and surprizing Treves, and the Palatinate. Is not this a breach of the Westphalian Peace? Pray do not excuse France in every thing, but consider also the wrong which hath been done this State, and its Allies, and which yet continues. The King of Sweden himself hath been obliged to confess, that France had used such a conduct, which hath been a great deal contrary to the Westphalian Peace; And yet hath he not taken up Armes, to revenge and divert so many injuries, which France committed against the said Westphalian Peace.

Friedman.

I intreat you, Sir, to hearken to reason, and not to be led away by passion; There is none, much less my self, who thinks this State blind, but rather very circumspect and clear-sighted; whereof divers proofs are extant: And what I have said, only tends so far, that the King of Sweden may justly insist, that the Elector should observe the Treaties betwixt them; and not under any subterfuge, and contrived pretexts, go to destroy the Westphalian Peace. I am assured, that it is not the King of Sweden's design, that any prejudice should be by his Conduct done to this State, which now can have a good Peace, when it pleaseth; neither that France should recover breath, to invade this State, which the King of Sweden hath always by his endeavours upheld; nor to infest Germany, whose tranquillity is also the Crown of Sweden's tranquillity, and whose welfare is also the Crown of Sweden's welfare: But since France declares its willingness, to withdraw its Forces out of Germany, and absolutely to stand to the *Instrumentum Pacis*, or the Treaty of Westphalia, provided

ded the Emperour and his Allies will do the same; it is but just, that so good a Declaration of *France* should be admitted, and it is much less necessary, to use any violence against those places, which are belonging unto *France* in the *Roman* Empire. The King of *Sweden* doth not intend, to justifie all the actions of *France*; neither will I my self do it, but leave the same to *France* it self. Nay the Declaration of the King of *Sweden* doth clearly shew, that he is not satisfied with the whole Conduct; neither hath the King of *Sweden* neglected to remonstrate the same unto *France*: However *France* hath not been without some reasons, to justifie some of its actions. *France* says, it hath obtained those places in *Liege* and *Cologne* only for a certain time, with the consent of their Sovereigns, and its Confederates: The Towns in *Cleves* were taken by vertue of the Laws of Nations, since its Enemies the *Dutch* Garrisons lay in them: And it is doubtfull, whether this State may upon a better ground pretend to keep the possession of the said places in perpetuity from a Prince of the Empire, to whom they properly do belong; or *France* to attack them, with promise to restore them to the true Owner, if once gotten out of the *Dutch* hands. And it is most certain, that the King of *France* did ingage, not to touch any such Forts or places, if the Garrisons of the *States General* had not been in them, or if the King of *France* might have had any assurance, that he was not to fear any Acts of hostility from the same Garrisons. There hath been also intercepted some Letters, as *France* gives out, that some thousands of *Spaniards*, under the Emperour's Banner, should possess themselves of the City of *Trier*. The Elector Palatine, as *France* alledgeth, hath first declared himself an Enemy, by making a Treaty with the Emperour. And, that *France* hath been obliged to continue its Troops in *Germany*, doth not argue, that *France* hath any hatred against the States of the Empire, (which *France* together with the Crown of *Sweden* did formerly restore to their Rights) But the King of *France* only desired a Declaration of the Emperour, that he would forbear to attack him, contrary to

to the Instrument of Peace, then would *France* immediately withdraw its Troops out of *Germany*; hoping also, to have given a sufficient proof of its earnest design, to leave the Empire in a peaceable condition, by its ready and friendly composition of the differences with *Brandenburgh*: But such a Declaration could never be had, either from the Deputies of the States of the Empire at *Ratisbone*, or from any other Friends: The aversion to it hath been discovered on all sides. And it hath been commended by almost all the States of the Empire, that *Sweden* did not immediately take up Armes, when its Friends and Allies on all sides fell out unhappily amongst themselves, but rather entertained constantly thoughts and ways of Peace. But this State may less wonder at it, in regard the Treaty depending between the Crown of *Sweden*, and this State, gives leave first to try an amicable reconciliation: But whatever this may be, it doth not at present avail any thing, to rip up all the old passages happened in this War, if a Peace be earnestly desired. This however pleads for *France*, that it shews a willingness to Peace, and hath as well heretofore very often declared the same, as also very lately in its Answer to Baron *Spars* the *Swedish* Embassadour's Memorial, to which in such a manner hath it expressed it self, that I see not what can be more desired of *France*; whereas it might have been expected, that by the success of its Armes in *Alsatia*, it might perhaps have been transported to less peaceable thoughts or counsels. For, concerning the place of Treaty, what clearer mark of a true inclination, of facilitating in this point the Negotiation of Peace, can this State desire of *France*, then that the same, in stead of being vexed about the refusal of *Breda*, (which this State upon the perswasion of its Allies did make) condescended so far, as to leave to this State the absolute freedom, to chuse and nominate any other place, lying under the *States General's* Jurisdiction, or within their Territories? And it cannot deserve a sinister construction, that *France* hath taken some time of deliberation, to except against the City of *Hamborough*; since, when the same was nominated for a
place

place of Congress, the King of *France* had certain advice, that an Edict was sent from the Emperour's Court, to the Magistrates of *Hamborough*, enjoining them to remove from thence such Ministers, as were there imployed in the King of *France's* service. The Envoy of *Spain*, who was in my time in *Swedeland*, hath also highly threatned the Magistracy at *Hamborough*, if they suffer'd any *French* Agents to stay there, as I have been informed by a Friends Letter from those parts. And the King of *France* found himself obliged, by such like strict Avocatory Letters, which the Emperour had sent abroad, not to condescend to any other place in the *Roman* Empire, thinking it inconvenient and unsafe for a Treaty. *France* hath also shew'd it self very ready, to remove the difficulty concerning the Passes for the Plenipotentiaries of the Duke of *Lorraine*, to come to the Treaty, by promising to give them the said Passes. *France* hath likewise declared its willingness, to admit some expedient in the cause of Prince *William* of *Furstenbergh*; and to give order to its Plenipotentiaries, for the treating at the place of Treaty, about a Cessation of Armes, for the next Campagne, during which time, a Peace, with Gods blessing, possibly might have been concluded; provided this State would likewise on its own side, promote the work, and by its example and perswasion invite its Allies to the same. Which this State ought to do, having always declared, that it doth not desire to make any Conquest, and hath by the Almighty's help and assistance already recover'd its own again. It is also to be presumed, that *France*, concerning *Lorraine*, will stand to its Declaration, given to the *Swedish* Embassadors at *Cologne*, offering to march out of *Germany*, as I have told you before, and to leave all things to the disposition of the *Westphalian* Peace. And whereas the greatest difficulty might be, about giving satisfaction to *Spain*, I think there may be also found out some Expedients, whereby *Spain* may get a secure Peace.

Frieland.

Sir, you speak plausibly of that inclination which *France* hath to Peace: I believe, that it is likewise sufficiently known, out of

of those Declarations, which at the Emperour's Court have been given to the Swedish Ambassador Count Oxenstierna, that all willingness is found on the Emperour's side, to facilitate the Negotiation of Peace; since the Emperour not only hath accepted of the Crown of Sweden's Mediation, but also shewn himself inclined to a Cessation of Armes, and is like to declare himself favourably in Prince William of Furstenbergh's affair. And I can assure you, concerning this State, that it earnestly inclines to Peace, and that the same will appear by the work it self. But it falls out unluckily, that now, when we have the greatest hope of Peace, it should be obstructed by the rupture of the Swedes with Brandenburg.

Friedman.

I hope the Emperour, with the other Confederates, will like Christian Potentates, at length lay to heart that innocent blood, which hath been so miserably spilt, and with a Christian commiseration will endeavour to stench the same, by a speedy Peace. They have also on all sides so honourably always testified a good propension to a blessed Peace; But as far as I am informed, those Declarations which the Imperial Court hath given out hitherto, seem rather plausible, then likely to gain the desired effect: For first, the Emperour doth not fully testifie his consent to the Mediation of the King of *Sweden*; but he joyns thereunto this condition, that in the interim, and as long as the War continues, the King shall oblige himself to a perpetual Neutrality; which condition cannot be but intolerable for the King of *Sweden*, he tying himself by it, not to stir in his own defence, but to sit still and wast time, with vain and fruitless endeavours in his Mediation, notwithstanding the Emperour and the other Confederates, should so long remain opiniastre against Peace, untill they have got the *French* out of the Empire, and thereby gained a clear Field, and power after that, under some pretence to make a Quarrel against the *Swedes*, and to get them in the same manner out of their Provinces in *Germany*. And yet this might be dispensed with, if a Cessation of Armes could have been approved and accepted of,
by

by which a security in some measure had been provided against that danger, I just now discoursed about. But at length, they will admit a Cessation of Armes, yet with such a condition, as makes the affair impracticable; For it is insisted upon, that *France* shall first quit the *Franche Comte*, and restore *Lorrain*, with many such demands, which could in no other manner be made to *France*, unless it were absolutely conquer'd and subdued. And the Emperour can scarcely propose any other conditions, at the Treaty of Peace it self; And then is it surely better to say, he consents to the Peace it self, then to a bare Cessation upon the said conditions: And in case the Emperour reserve within himself other conditions, to be treated of at the said Treaty, he then will appear, to have no intentions at all for an equitable Peace. In Prince *Furstenbergh's* affair, it is promised, that the Process against him shall be stopped, which otherwise should be carried on; which is not an Expedient, that can warrant him from all danger, but he still remains in the same hazard he now is in, there is only given him some respite and reprieve for a while, to expect at last the extremity intended against him. As to all other obstacles, though the affairs betwixt the King of *Sweden*, and the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, are come to some broillerie, yet may they easily be composed. I can assure you, as I have told you already, that the King of *Sweden* doth not desire the least part of *Brandenburgh's* Country: And they both are so near Friends and Neighbours, and have also so many common Interests, that it may be presumed, their Controversie may quickly be terminated and decided, if only this State would not precipitate it self, but first seek in an amicable way to accommodate the matter. This proceeding hath ever been observed, and practised by Friends, and almost all the Treaties, which are made and concluded amongst Christians, aim at this.

Frieland.

It were to be wished, that Sweden would do it; This State cannot in honour abandon Brandenburgh; The Treaties are clear, and we must be as good as our word.

E

Friedman.

Friedman.

'Tis to be wondred at, that there is now such a fervency here. Before when *Denmark* and *Muscovy* fell upon *Sweden* without any cause, and *Sweden* according to Agreement demanded assistance of the *States General*, then were they extremely cold, nay at length so disposed to the contrary, that in stead of sending Succours, they came with a Fleet against the King of *Sweden*; and although they pretended a Mediation on the one side, yet on the other, they fell upon *Sweden* in a hostile manner. Whereas the Crown of *Sweden* doth not yet bear any Armes against this State, but as a Guarrand of the *German Peace*, hath been obliged to take up Armes, for maintaining that Interest which *Sweden* hath in the preservation of the Peace of *Westphalia*.

Surely this State, as well as all other well-minded people, ought not to guide their counsels by passion, but examine and consider what is just and honest; And it deserves praise and commendation, that this State is resolved, to perform its promise: But it is also hoped, that this State will be so just, as to have likewise this opinion of the King of *Sweden*, that his Majesty will do the like, and what Justice doth require of him. There is likewise a Treaty concluded betwixt him, and the King of *France*, meerly grounded (as I have said before) upon the Instrument of Peace: The same is not unknown to the Elector, and I believe, that this State is of opinion, that the same Treaty ought also to be kept and observed by, the King of *Sweden*. And if it should thus happen, that the Troops of this State should defeat the *Swedes*, should this State receive any great advantage thereby? I do fear, that it should not win very much by it, but rather, that both States should joyntly suffer thereby. The Crown of *Sweden* may possibly get many Enemies, according as it is here, as I do understand, very much threatned with; yet can it hardly be believed, that the Kingdom of *Sweden* and its Interest should be in so small a consideration with the rest of the Christian world, that it should find no Friend, by whom it might in case of necessity be assisted. We have seen many changes in

a little time; The same Play may yet be acted over again. The King of *Sweden* hath reason for what he hath undertaken; Justice is commonly concomitant to Necessity, and where the taking up of Armes cannot be avoided, there also a blessing may be looked for: It were to be wished, that this State would not meddle with affairs, wherein it has no concern; it may perhaps without that, get work enough. But if it cannot be by any means avoided, but that the King of *Sweden*, who makes profession, to be so great a Friend and Ally to this State, and hath made it evidently appear by so many undoubted proofs of his affection, and whose good offices are by this time made known to all the world, must now in lieu of thanks be requited with enmity, and an hostile Invasion, then must he be obliged, to Arm himself with patience: And it is to be presumed, that whensoever it should thus fall out, the *Swedes* would not be found altogether asleep.

Frieland.

What is it then that may be done in it, and by what means shall we arrive to a happy Peace?

Friedman.

You your self know that better then I: But since you give me an occasion to discourse with you about it, I cannot but tell you my opinion therein, which is this, that this State will never take a more Christian-like, and more praise-worthy resolution, then that of a speedy Peace; and that the Negotiation of Peace may be the sooner and the better reassumed, and facilitated by a Cessation of Armes: And that towards *Sweden* at least such marks of acknowledgment may be shewn, for its former indefatigable pains, taken in the Negotiation of Peace, which may produce peaceable inclinations, and keep back any new broillerie between both the States of *Sweden* and of *Holland*. And whereas I am as easily perswaded, as you are, that the *States General* desire nothing so much as a Peace; so am I also of opinion, that the *States General* have not engaged themselves any farther with their Allies, then to attain the same end, viz. a good and

speedy Peace. And therefore it were highly to be wished, that this State would with all diligence endeavour, to dive into the real designs and intentions of their Allies, and suit outward shews and appearances, to their inward designs: Then perhaps this State should find, that there is a secret and firm design, to make use of this opportunity, and under the colour of their assistance, to imploy the States money, to advance that, which for a great while hath been a brewing, viz. to remove, what hath been hitherto like an obstacle to them, and to obtain an uncontrolled disposition over the States of the Empire, and chiefly over the Protestants. Which at last will not prove very advantageous for the *States General*, since it is not to be expected, that they shall have by their Treaty of *Munster*, deserved so much from all parts, that they shall expect at all Conjunctions, a true and everlasting care and kindness for their Interest. And pray do but observe, can there ever be a more convenient means, to maintain this present War on foot, then by the Interest, which the Confederates have gotten with the *States General*, to make them blindly attend and follow their direction. You cannot but clearly see, what this at last will come to, chiefly if you rightly consider, what formerly is past both in *Germany*, and in *Poland*: For in the said *German War*, there was five years spent in the agreeing upon the Preliminaries, and the Treaty it self was spun out for three years more, with several difficulties, only to nourish the War by the assistance and charge of others, untill the Electors of *Mayence* and *Bavaria*, from whom the Emperour had his greatest strength, did see, that their Countries suffered the most, and went to ruine, and therefore declared themselves inclined to a Peace; whereupon likewise some other States of the Empire joyned themselves with the said Electors, to that same purpose. In *Poland* was the War also by many means underhand protracted against *Sweden*, not so much for *Poland's* defence or advantage, as in hopes to prepare an easier way for the then approaching Election of a King, by the abating of the *Swedish* Forces, and weakening of the

Polanders.

Polanders. Which continued till such a time, that the *Polanders* began to suspect, that there was no good matters on foot for their Republique, and therefore privately conferred with the *Swedish* Embassadors at *Oliva* (the place of Treaty) and at last clearly gave to understand to their Confederates, that they desired Peace, since they found, that *Sweden* was likewise inclining thereunto. And this is not much unlike to what happened at *Cologne*, to break off that Negotiation, Prince *William* of *Furstenbergh* was violently seized on, and carried away, whereby not only was violated that security, which was given to the said Place, and without which the Treaty could neither begin nor continue there, but also, when it was perceived, that all the Plenipotentiaries did not as yet thereupon prepare themselves, with such an earnestness as was expected, for a return to their respective homes, but stayed yet a little at the instant request of the *Swedish* Plenipotentiaries, they added to the former violence another, by taking away the *French* money in the very same City of *Cologne*, to no other end, but that the King of *France* should be forced to call away his Embassadors: Whereby they at last got so far their ends, that that Negotiation of Peace was broken off, and till this very day never could be brought on foot again. It had been to be wished, that some resolution of the *States General* had followed upon the Declaration of *France*, that the Parties concerned might have met again; But whereas I do not pretend, narrowly to enquire into the reasons, which have moved the *States General* to nominate *Moeurs* for a new place of Treaty, so will I leave it to you, to consider and to judge, if it was not a very great misfortune, that just for that Dependencies sake, which the said Town of *Moeurs* hath of the Empire, and where it hath its seat and vote like a Member thereof, an Exception could be taken against the said place, as striving directly against the conditions proposed in the said Declaration of the King of *France*, for a place of Treaty: And although a new place, viz. *Nimwegen*, is nominated, yet is there little likelihood of coming there as yet together, whereby that wholesome
work

work of Peace lies so long at stake, and time so irreparably lost, whereof yet every moment is extremely precious, in regard of those many dangers, to which so many thousand men in the mean while must remain exposed. And I cannot forbear to tell you, that there are some, who do apprehend, that this resolution for nominating *Moeurs* for a place of Negotiation, must doubtless proceed from a preceding communication of the *States General* with their Confederates, and that there lay some reasons hid under it, for to elude and to put off the Negotiation of Peace. But it would be to the *States General's* eternal praise, if they amongst so many difficulties would endeavour to accelerate a Peace, which example of theirs would be followed by their Allies, or would at least discover to the world, what their drift and aim is. Nor could any thing redound to the greater glory of the *States General*, then if they strove, to meet the King of *France* with the same forwardness, as he hath done with his Allies, for Peace, as a thing the most becoming Christian Princes: And were there no other motive to it, yet methinks the saving of so much Christian blood in the Empire, might perswade them thereunto, since upon their accompt it is, that all this misery of War, and other calamities, is befalln it. Yea that thankfulness, which the *States General* owe to God Almighty, for being by his wonderful mercy delivered from an extreme danger, and for being brought to the condition of having a Peace in their power, obliges them, even for their Allies sakes, as well as their own, to put an end to these confusions, being engaged with themselves in one common Fate. I wish therefore most heartily, that the *States General* would lay more to heart, the faithfull endeavours which the Crown of *Sweden* hath used for the Restoration of Peace, then the passionate suggestions of others, who study nothing more, then to see a breach in that real Friendship, which hath been between *Sweden* and the *States General*, thereby to attain those ends, which by a speedy Peace they cannot reach. The King of *Sweden's* firm and often reiterated Assurances, the project of a nearer and stricter Alliance and Union with the *States General*,

veral, and his continual and faithfull endeavours and pains
 in the Mediation, which in spight of all mis-interpretations,
 his Majesty most impartially hath continued, are evident
 proofs of his sincere intention. And to be the more convin-
 ced, that the King of *Sweden* really intends a Peace, it is to
 be observed, that although the Elector of *Brandenburgh* went
 about with a design, which could not prove but very preju-
 dicial to his Majesty, yet could it not turn him from his real
 thoughts for Peace, but procures from the King of *France* by
 his Minister such a Declaration, that there was a fair hope
 to expect another Assembly of all Parties Plenipotentiaries,
 and a Negotiation for an universal Peace. And according
 to my opinion, and knowledge of these affairs, it seems
Sweden hath always shewn a real affection towards it,
 throughout the whole Mediation: For although the *Swedish*
 Plenipotentiaries were obliged sometimes to deliver over
 unto the *Dutch* Plenipotentiaries at *Cologne*, those Projects
 or Conditions of Peace, from the adverse Parties, which
 seemed to be too hard and heavy to undergo; it cannot be
 called a Partiality, since it was not in their power, to re-
 fuse the communication of one Party's Project to the other
 Party, when it was desired. For they were not Arbiters;
 whose charge had been, to judge of either Party's just or
 unjust demands, and to determine the same, with a final De-
 cision; but only Mediators, whose office is to communicate
 to one Party, what the other Party demands is, and what
 hath been entrusted to them, to propose, and afterwards by
 their good offices and mediation, endeavour to moderate
 those matters which occasion any difference. Had it been
 so, that the *Swedish* Plenipotentiaries had concealed those
 Projects, which the *States General's* Embassadors did deliver
 unto them, then there might have been some ground and
 reason, to speak of a partiality; But this was not only ne-
 ver done by the *Swedish* Embassadors, although they clearly
 perceived, that the Projects of this State were such, that by
 both the Most Christian King, and his Majesty of *Great Bri-
 tain*, they could not well be look'd upon; but they did
 also

also carry themselves so much in favour of this State, that both the Kings began to shew some dissatisfaction with them, and their instances, which they made in the behalf of this State, and its demands : Which should at least free the *Swedish* Embassadors from being suspected or accused, to have shew'd more inclination for *England* and *France*, then for this State. Yea it is moreover very well known, with what earnestness one of the *Swedish* Plenipotentiaries, Count *Tot*, endeavoured with the King of *France* in favour of the *Dutch* about *Maëstricht*, insomuch that the said King thought himself at last obliged to ask him, if he had any order from the King his Master, to declare War against him. These, and the like more passages, ought at least to receive such a consideration with this State, that it should shew to the Crown of *Sweden* some thankfull acknowledgments for them : which if this State does, and continues with such counsels, whereby all differences with *Sweden* may be prevented ; if it lays hold on peaceable means, to advance and promote a speedy Negotiation of Peace ; if it cuts off all those delays and prolixities, which one or other might create, and gives ear to the propounded Cessation of Armes ; Then I hope, all will go well ; the fierce flames of War will be quencht, all new threatening troubles of War will cease, and Christendom will then rejoyce, to see a happy and a joyfull Peace restored ; which I wish with all my heart.

Frieland.

And I do very heartily wish the same, giving you very hearty thanks for the honour of so profitable a Conversation, which I have now enjoyed. And whereas I dare not presume to trespass any longer upon your goodness, I beg your pardon, for having been so troublesome to you with my questions and discourses ; not doubting, but that at another time, and during your abode here amongst us, I shall be still so happy, as to enjoy your good company. In the mean while I humbly take my leave of you, and am going to the Court, to hear what further News the Letters may have brought this day.

Friedman.

(39)

Friedman:


I have great reason to beg your excuse, for having entertained you with these discourses: I shall not fail to wait on you at any other time, and so long as I continue in these parts, to enjoy your agreeable conversation. And I hope, if any News come to your hand, you will let me take part with you. So I take my leave.


Frieland.

I remain your Obedient Servant. Adieu.

FINIS.

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